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1999 under a production flexibility contract for the farm
under the Agricultural Market Transition Act….”15  That
provision is titled, “Market Loss Assistance.”16  Because the
legislation does not refer to the payments as “disaster
payments” or payments “for the destruction or damage to
crops,” the payments do not appear to be deferrable to 2000.17
Similar language was used in the provision authorizing
payments to producers of the 1999 crop of oilseeds “that are
eligible to obtain a marketing assistance loan.”18  Ag i , the
payments do not appear to be deferrable.19
An amount of $325,000,000 was authorized “to provide
assistance directly to livestock and dairy producers…to
compensate the producers for economic losses incurred
during 1999.20  Those amounts are income to the producers in
the year received.
Benefits to producers of upland cotton,21 pea uts22 and
tobacco23 are likewise not deferrable.
The legislation also authorizes the advance payment in full
of remaining payments under production flexibility contracts
through 2002.24  Those payments would also be taxable in the
year of receipt.  Legislation was enacted in 1998 making
payments under the Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996 not subject to constructive receipt,
effective for taxable years after 1995.25  That legislation
followed the enactment of legislation advancing, on an
elective basis, the spring, 1999, federal farm program
payment to the autumn of 1998.26
The 1999 legislation increased the limit on marketing loan
gains and loan deficiency payments for the 1999 crop year to
$150,000.27
In conclusion
With net farm income expected to be lower in 1999 than in
recent years, it may be good tax planning anyway to include
payments in 1999 rather than to defer taxability of payments
to 2000.  However, the taxpayer does not have that choice
except for 1999 disaster payments for crop losses.28
FOOTNOTES
1 Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-78, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
2 I.R.C. § 451(d).  See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law §
27.03[7] (1999); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.02[4]
(1999).  See also Harl, “Reporting Government Farm
P yments,” 9 Agric. L. Dig. 157 (1999).
3 I.R.C. § 451(d).  See Rev. Rul. 91-55, 1991-2 C.B. 784,
revoking Rev. Rul. 75-36, 1975-1 C.B. 143.
4 I.R.C. § 451(d).
5 Notice 89-55, 1989-1 C.B. 696.
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-6(a)(2).
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-6(b)(2).
8 Rev. Rul. 74-145, 1974-1 C.B. 113.
9 Id.  See Notice 89-55, 1989-1 C.B. 696.
10 I.R.C. § 451(d).
11 Id.
12 See n. 1 supra.
13 Pub. L. No. 106-78, Sec. 801(a), 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
14 See I.R.C. § 451(d).
15 Pub. L. No. 106-78, Sec. 802, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
16 Id.
17 I.R.C. § 451(d).
18 Pub. L. No. 106-78, Sec. 804, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
19 See I.R.C. § 451(d).
20 Pub. L. No. 106-78, Sec. 805, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
21 Pub. L. No. 106-78, Sec. 806, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
22 Pub. L. No. 106-78, Sec. 803(a), 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
23 Pub. L. No. 106-78, Sec. 803(c), 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
24 Pub. L. No. 106-78, Sec. 811, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
25 Pub. L. 105-277, Sec. 2012(b), 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1998).
26 Pub. L. 105-228, 112 Stat. 1516 (1998).
27 Pub. L. No. 106-78, Sec. 813, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
28 Pub. L. No. 106-78, Sec. 801, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
COTENANTS. The plaintiffs first received the farm
property as remainder holders after a life estate, created in
1968, held by the plaintiffs’ father. The father received the
life estate upon the death of the plaintiffs’ mother who had
received the property from her parents in 1955. However, the
plaintiffs discovered, in a title opinion in 1996, that the 1955
transfer from the grandparents to the mother was actually to
the mother and father as tenants in common. Thus, the father
owned one-half of the property in fee and that one-half
interest passed, in part, to other heirs of the father. The
plaintiffs sought to clear the title, arguing that the plaintiffs
acquired title by adverse possession from 1968 to the present
acti n. The plaintiffs actively farmed the land and paid the
taxes. T  defendants argued that adverse possession did not
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apply between cotenants unless there was an ouster of one
cotenant. The court held that an exception to this rule applied
in that the mother’s will transferred the entire fee, first as a
life estate to the father, and then as a remainder to the
plaintiffs. The court held that the transfer of an entire interest
by the creation of the remainder to the plaintiffs acted as an
ouster of the father’s cotenancy interest, allowing the
plaintiffs to acquire title by adverse possession of the
property. Buchanan v. Rediger, 975 P.2d 1225 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1999).
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS .
EARNED INCOME CREDIT. The debtor filed for Chapter
7 in November 1998 and filed the 1998 tax return in 1999,
claiming a refund. The debtor claimed the earned income
credit portion of the refund as either (1) not estate property,
(2) exempt as wages under 15 U.S.C. § 1673 or (3) exempt
under Wyo. Stat. § 42-2-113 as a public assistance payment.
The court held that (1) the refund was estate property; (2) the
earned income credit was a refund of taxes, not wages; and
(3) was not eligible for the public assistance exemption. In re
Trudeau, 237 B.R. 803 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1999).
WAGES. The debtor was an entertainer and sole
shareholder of an S corporation. The debtor’s entertainment
contracts were handled by the corporation. Just before filing
for bankruptcy, the corporation paid most of its cash to the
debtor as “wages.” The debtor claimed an exemption for the
“wages.” The trustee objected to the exemption, arguing that
the debtor was an independent contractor and did not receive
exempt wages. The court held that the debtor was an
employee of the S corporation because the entertainment
contracts, payments and expenses were handled by the
corporation. The case was remanded for evidence as to how
much of the payment was actually wages, since the payment
was a large lump-sum made on the eve of filing for
bankruptcy. In re Carter, 182 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 1999).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtor, an attorney, failed to file
income tax returns for six consecutive tax years. The
evidence demonstrated that the debtor paid some of the taxes
as estimated payments and payments with requests for
extension. The evidence also showed that the debtor had
sufficient income and funds to pay the amounts owed. The
court found that, during the first two years, the debtor’s
failure to file was caused by actions of the debtor’s former
spouse, and the court held that the taxes owed for those two
years were dischargeable because the debtor did not willfully
attempt to evade payment of those taxes. The court held that
the taxes owed for the other tax years were nondischargeable
because the debtor was aware of the need to pay the taxes,
had the money to pay the taxes and chose not to file accurate
returns and pay the full taxes due. In re Weiss, 237 B.R. 600
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999).
The debtor failed to file income tax returns and pay taxes
for several tax years. For other tax years in question, the
d btor fil d returns but did not pay the taxes. The debtor also
filed false employment forms with the debtor’s employer,
claiming excessive exemptions. The IRS filed a claim for the
unpaid taxes and sought a ruling that the taxes were
nondischargeable because of the debtor’s willful attempt to
evade t xes. The IRS filed a tax lien and the debtor sought to
exclude the debtor’s interest in a pension plan from the tax
lien. The court held that the evidence demonstrated that the
debtor failed to pay the taxes when the debtor knew the taxes
were owed and had funds to pay the taxes. The court also
held that the willfulness of the failure to pay was
demonstrated by the false employment forms. The court also
held that the tax lien attached to the pension funds, whether
or not the funds were eventually held to be exempt, which
was not decided in this case. In r  Tudisco, 183 F.3d 133
(2d Cir. 1999).
POST-PETITION INTEREST . The Chapter 7 trustee
fil d the estate’s income tax returns for four years in 1996.
The IRS assessed penalties and interest for the late taxes. The
trustee included the penalties and interest in the final
distribution as an administrative expense. The court held that
S ction 503(b) did not include interest on post-petition
interest as an administrative expense. In re Weinstein, 237
B.R. 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999).
The taxpayer originally filed for Chapter 13 and made
payment of all tax claims under the plan. However, the
taxpayer did not receive a discharge in that case because the
taxpayer converted the case to Chapter 7 before completing
all plan payments. The IRS assessed post-petition penalties
and interest on the tax claims after the Chapter 7 case was
closed. The court held that, although the penalties and interest
would have been discharged in the Chapter 13 case if the
taxpayer had received a discharge in that case, the penalties
and int rest were not discharged in the Chapter 7 case and the
taxpayer remained liable for them once the Chapter 7 case
w s closed. In re Holway, 237 B.R. 217 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1999).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
CLEAN WATER ACT.  The plaintiff brought actions
under the federal Clean Water Act and the Washington
Pollution Control Act against the defendants, livestock
confinement facility operators for improper discharge of
animal wastes. The defendants initially argued that they were
not concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) as
defined in the CWA, but the court found that each facility
confined and maintained more than 700 head of dairy cattle
at each facility. The defendants also argued that the entire
facilities were not point sources subject to the CWA, but that
only the portions of the facilities which involved animal
waste were regulated by the CWA. The court held that the
CWA did not include any provision for classifying only a
portion of a CAFO as a point source for pollution; therefore,
the entire facility was subject to the CWA as a pollution point
source. However, the court held that an issue of fact remained
as to the extent the portions of the manure spreading
operation on the land around the facility were part of the
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point source regulated by the CWA. The court also held that
a fact issue remained as to whether the drains, ditches and
canals around the facilities were regulated by the CWA as
“waters of the United States.” Finally, the court held that the
plaintiffs had a private right of action to enforce the
provisions of the Washington Pollution Control Act.
Community Ass’n for Restoration v. Sid Koopman Dairy,
54 F. Supp.2d 976 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
CONTRACTS
RESCISSION. The plaintiff transferred a farm to a
daughter and her husband, retaining a life estate in the farm
buildings. The plaintiff claimed that the daughter agreed to
support the plaintiff for the rest of the plaintiff’s life in
exchange for the transfer. After disagreements arose, the
daughter attempted to evict the plaintiff and filed for
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy plan proposed to sell the farm to
pay the daughter’s debts and the plaintiff objected to the plan
as unfeasible. The plaintiff argued that the eviction rescinded
the contract because the daughter no longer agreed to support
the plaintiff. The property transfer agreement did not contain
any promise of support. The court held that the plaintiff failed
to provide evidence that the conveyance was made in
exchange for a promise of support or that the parties intended
the conveyance to be in exchange for the promise of support.
In re Fillion, 181 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 1999).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
LIVESTOCK INDEMNITY PROGRAM . The CCC has
issued interim regulations which set forth the terms and
conditions for the 1999 Livestock Indemnity Program,
authorized by the 1999 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act. The program will provide monetary
assistance to producers for livestock losses due to natural
disasters occurring between May 2, 1998, and May 21, 1999.
Also, this rule sets out a clarifying change regarding offsets
and withholdings from payments made in the crop disaster
program operated under 7 CFR Part 1477. 64 Fed. Reg.
58766 (Nov. 1, 1999).
LIVESTOCK MANDATORY REPORTING . The
Congress has enacted the Livestock Mandatory Reporting
Act of 1999. The Act establishes a requirement that packers
of cattle, swine, and lambs report information on the
livestock passing through their facilities. A packer includes
“any person engaged in the business of buying cattle [or
swine] in commerce for purposes of slaughter, of
manufacturing or preparing meats or meat food products . . .
for sale or shipment in commerce, or of marketing meat or
meat food products . . . in an unmanufactured form acting as
a wholesale broker, dealer or distributor in commerce.” The
term packer as to cattle packers also refers only to federally
inspected processing plants which slaughter an average of at
least 125,000 head of cattle over the previous last five years.
Pub. L. No. 106-78, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION . The defendant
was a custom meat slaughterer and was indicted for violating
the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 610(a) for
failure to mark the meat as “Not for Sale” and for failing to
operat  the business in a sanitary manner. The defendant’s
operation prepared meat from carcasses supplied by the
customers who received the prepared meat. The defendant
argued that the Act did not apply to the defendant because the
meat was not offered for sale to customers. The court held
that the Act applied to operations which prepared meat “for
commerce” and that term included meat custom prepared for
customers who supplied the animals for slaughter. United
States v. Turner, 50 F. Supp.2d 687 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT . The AMS has issued proposed regulations under
PACA which provide that a Limited Liability Company
(LLC) is a legal entity under PACA and that members of an
LLC and/or any other person authorized by the members to
conduct business on behalf of an LLC are considered
“responsibly connected” with the LLC. An LLC will be
quired to provide information about its members and
organization in order to receive a PACA license. 64 Fed.
Reg. 57405 (Oct. 25, 1999).
TUBERCULOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations to allow zones within a state to be assigned
different risk statuses and to clarify the conditions for
assigning a particular risk status for bovine tuberculosis. The
interim regulations also increase the amount of testing that
must be done before certain cattle and bison may be moved
interstate. 64 Fed. Reg. 58769 (Nov. 1, 1999).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
ALTERNATE VALUATION DATE . The decedent’s
estate included shares of stock in a trust. The estate claimed
that the stock was eligible for a blockage discount. The stock
was sold within six months after the decedent’s death. The
estate made a protective election to value the shares as of the
alternate valuation date if the value of the stock and the tax
on the stock were determined to be higher on the date of
death. The IRS held that the protective election was allowed.
Ltr. Rul. 9942015, July 22, 1999.
GIFTS . The decedent had received a one-half interest in
the estate of the decedent’s predeceased spouse. The one-half
interest was eligible for the marital deduction which the
predeceased spouse’s estate claimed. The predeceased
spouse’s estate was not closed before the decedent died, 14
years later, and the estate generated investment income. The
decedent was entitled to one-half of this investment income
but no distributions were made. Instead, the estate income
was used in the family farming and other operations in which
the decedent’s children participated. The decedent had given
interests in the farm and other estate assets over the 14 years
in amounts which approximated the annual exclusion
amount. The IRS argued that the use of this investment
income in the business operations was a series of gifts to the
children. The court found that, although the decedent was
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entitled to one-half of this investment income, the decedent’s
estate did not include any of that income. The estate argued
that the decedent had contributed the investment income to
the family operations which were run as a partnership with
the children. The court held that no partnership existed
because (1) no separate bank accounts were maintained, (2)
no Form 1065 was filed for any tax year, and (3) no
partnership agreement was executed. The estate also argued
that the decedent contributed the investment income to the
farming operations as a business investment as the decedent’s
share. The court found that the other family members did not
contribute significant amounts of money or services to match
the decedent’s contribution; therefore, the additional amounts
contributed by the decedent were gifts to the children. Estate
of Hendrickson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-357.
REVOCABLE TRANSFERS . Before the decedent died
the decedent executed a durable power of attorney in favor of
an heir. Before the decedent died the heir issued several
checks on the decedent’s checking account to various heirs
but the checks were not delivered or cashed until after the
decedent died. The estate argued that, under the relation-back
doctrine, the date of the gifts related back to the date the
checks were executed, removing the gifts from the decedent’s
gross estate. The estate claimed that the decedent could not
revoke the gifts because the decedent was too ill. The estate
cited Estate of Metzger v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 204
(1993), aff’d, 38 F.3d 118 (4th Cir. 1994), as allowing use of
the relation-back doctrine to treat the checks as gifts on the
date of execution, instead of the date the check is cashed. The
court distinguished Metzger as applying only to charitable
gifts and held that noncharitable gifts remain revocable until
the decedent’s death if not cashed before the decedent’s
death. The appellate court afirmed the decision without a
published opnion. Estate of Newman v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,358 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff’g 111 T.C.
No. 3 (1998).
VALUATION . The decedent owned undivided interests in
several parcels of real property. The IRS ruled that one
proper method of valuation of the undivided interests, for
estate tax purposes, was to first determine the fair market
value of the fee interest of each property, multiply that
amount by the undivided interest fraction, and subtract from
each value the share of the costs of partition allocable to the
undivided interest. Thus, the estate could deduct the
hypothetical costs of partitioning the undivided interests from
the fair market value of each undivided interest. Ltr. Rul.
9943003, June 7, 1999.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer received income
from lecturing and claimed expenses for, among other items,
rental of formal clothing and for lost luggage. The taxpayer
did not provide any written receipts which itemized the
clothing rental and did not identify the purposes for which the
clothing was worn. The taxpayer did not provide any police
report for the lost luggage or any evidence of the cost of the
luggage or its contents. The court disallowed both deductions
for lack of substantiation. McBrayer v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1999-360.
CASUALTY LOSS . In 1992 through 1995, the taxpayer
claimed a casualty loss deduction for a “nonviable fetus”
which was aborted by the taxpayer’s former spouse in the
mid-1970s. The court disallowed the deduction as untimely
claimed and because a nonviable fetus was not property for
purposes of I.R.C. § 165(c)(3). Riley v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1999-363.
DEPRECIATION . Although the 1993 field service advice
has all dates removed, apparently the taxpayer had used a
fully depreciated automobile in a trade or business for less
than 50 percent of total use in a tax year following the last tax
year in which I.R.C. § 179 expense depreciation was taken.
The IRS ruled that, even though the reduction in business use
occurred in a tax year after the last recovery year had expired,
the taxpayer had to recapture any excess depreciation taken
above that which would have been taken using the straight-
line method over five years. FSA 1993-1007-1, Oct. 7, 1993.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . The President, on Sept. 23,
1999, determined that certain areas in Connecticut are
eligible for assistance from the federal government under the
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act as a result of
Tropical Storm Floyd on Sept. 16, 1999. Accordingly, a
taxpayer who sustained a loss attributable to the disaster
occurring in Litchfield County may deduct the loss on his or
her 1998 federal income tax return. FEMA-1302-DR. On
Sept. 18, the President determined that certain areas in
Pennsylvania are eligible for assistance from the federal
government under the Act as a result of Hurricane Floyd on
Sept. 16, 1999. A taxpayer who sustained a loss attributable
to the disaster occurring in Berks County may deduct the loss
on his or her 1998 federal income tax return. FEMA-1294-
DR. On Sept. 18, the President determined that certain areas
in Virginia are eligible for assistance from the federal
gover ment under the Act as a result of Hurricane Floyd on
Sept. 13, 1999. Taxpayers who sustained losses attributable
to the disaster occurring in the counties of Brunswick,
Charles City, Essex, New Kent, Northampton, Richmond and
Westmoreland may deduct the losses on their 1998 federal
income tax returns. FEMA-1293-DR. On Oct. 15, 1999, the
Pr sident determined that certain areas in Arizona are eligible
for assistance from the federal government under the Act as a
ult of severe storms, flooding and high winds beginning on
Sept. 14, 1999. Accordingly, taxpayers who sustained losses
attributable to the disaster occurring in Maricopa County may
deduct them on their 1998 federal income tax returns.
FEMA-1304-DR On Oct. 20, 1999, the President determined
that certain areas in Florida are eligible for assistance from
the federal government under the Act as a result of Hurricane
Irene beginning on Oct. 14, 1999. Accordingly, taxpayers
who sustained a loss attributable to the disaster occurring in
the counties of Brevard, Broward, Collier, Dade, Glades,
Hendry, Highlands, Indian River, Martin, Monroe,
Okeechobee, Orange, Osceola, Palm Beach, Polk, St. Lucie,
Seminole and Volusia may deduct the loss on his or her 1998
federal income tax return. FEMA-1306-DR.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was a medical doctor who
had purchased a cattle ranch 43 miles from the taxpayer’s
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residence. About 35 percent of the ranch was suitable for
cattle grazing and the ranch had a net profit only in the
twelfth year of operation when most of the cattle were sold.
The court held that the taxpayer did not have an intent to
make a profit with the ranch because (1) the taxpayer did not
keep separate records and bank accounts for the ranch, (2) the
taxpayer spent only spare time on the ranch and much of that
time was spent for personal pleasure, (3) the taxpayer had no
business plan or budget for the ranch, (4) the small amount of
grazing land precluded the ranch from ever being profitable,
and (5) the ranch produced substantial losses which offset
income from the taxpayer’s employment as a doctor. Goforth
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-356.
IRA . The taxpayer, at the age of 52, received a distribution
from the taxpayer’s IRA and included the amount in taxable
income. However, the taxpayer did not pay the 10 percent
additional tax. The taxpayer argued that (1) the taxpayer
relied on the advice of an IRS agent that the penalty was not
due and (2) the taxpayer’s financial hardship should excuse
the taxpayer from the penalty. The court held that neither
incorrect advice from an IRS agent nor the taxpayer’s
financial distress were insufficient to relieve the taxpayer of
the penalty. Deal v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-352.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in October 1999,
the weighted average is 5.99 percent with the permissible
range of 5.39 to 6.29 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible
range) and 5.39 to 6.59 percent (90 to 110 percent
permissible range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 99-52,
I.R.B. 1999-43, 525.
RETURNS. The IRS has released Publication 225 (1999),
Farmer's Tax Guide. The document is available at no charge
and can be obtained either (1) by calling the IRS's toll-free
telephone number, 1-800-829-3676; (2) via World Wide Web
at http://www.irs.gov/prod/cover.html; (3) through FedWorld
on the Internet; or (4) by directly accessing the Internal
Revenue Information Services bulletin board at (703) 321-
8020.
The IRS has announced that it will expand the availability
of payment of taxes by credit card to individuals seeking
automatic extensions of time to file returns and those making
estimated tax payments for tax year 2000. There will also be
new opportunities to file and pay taxes electronically. The
IRS offers these electronic payment options through
partnerships with private industry, including credit card
processors and tax preparation software developers. IR-1999-
87.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
SHAREHOLDER BASIS. The taxpayer owned a one-third
share of an S corporation for which the taxpayer paid $3,500.
The taxpayer claimed to have borrowed additional money
which was loaned to the corporation; however, the court
found that some of the loans were renewals of previous loans.
The court found that the taxpayer had received payments
from the corporation almost equal to amounts borrowed and
loaned to the company. The court also found that the taxpayer
had claimed a portion of the S corporation losses in previous
years in an amount greater than the original basis for the
taxpayer’s interest in the corporation. Thus, the court held
that the taxpayer had no basis left in the corporation in the tax
year involved and could not claim any additional share of
company losses. Hogan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-365.
CONVERSION TO PARTNERSHIP. An S corporation
converted to a limited partnership by first creating an LLC
which purchased an equal interest in the corporation and then
converting the corporation to an LP with the original
shareholder as limited partner and the new LLC as a general
partner. The conversion was intended to qualify as a “type F”
reorganization, I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(F) so as to not lose the S
corporation election. The new LP elected to be taxed as an
association under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3. The IRS ruled
that the LP did not lose its S corporation status because of the
conversion. Ltr. Rul. 9942009, July 16, 1999.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer contributed S corporation stock to
an irrevocable trust. The trust agreement provided that the
trustees had the authority to make loans to the taxpayer, and
the taxpayer had the authority to borrow from the trust, all or
any part of the corpus and/or income of the trust, without
adequate security, in exchange for the taxpayer's promissory
note of equal value to the amount loaned. The S corporation
and the taxpayer represented that it was their intention that
this provision allowed the taxpayer to exercise this power
unconditionally, without the approval of the trustees, or any
other party. The trust agreement also provided that the
taxpayer had the right and power at any time, acting in a
nonfiduciary capacity and without consent of the trustees, to
withdraw any asset of the trust if the taxpayer simultaneously
contributed other property of an equivalent value. The IRS
ruled that the taxpayer would be treated as the owner of the
trust and that the trust was an eligible shareholder of the S
corporation. FSA Ltr. Rul. 9942017, July 22, 1999.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
November 1999
AnnualSemi-annual QuarterlyMonthly
Short-term
AFR 5.57 5.49 5.45 5.43
110 percent AFR 6.13 6.04 6.00 5.97
120 percent AFR 6.70 6.59 6.54 6.50
Mid-term
AFR 6.08 5.99 5.95 5.92
110 percent AFR 6.70 6.59 6.54 6.50
120 percent AFR 7.32 7.19 7.13 7.08
Long-term
AFR 6.39 6.29 6.24 6.21
110 percent AFR 7.04 6.92 6.86 6.82
120 percent AFR 7.69 7.55 7.48 7.43
Rev. Rul. 99-45, I.R.B. 1999-45.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. In a case involving tax law prior
to passage of the residence exclusion, the taxpayers sold their
previous residence for a gain in December 1991 and
purchased a new residence for an amount less than the gain in
May 1992. The taxpayers immediately began to plan and
begin construction of a detached addition to the new
residence. However, two years after the sale of the first
house, the new addition was not in livable condition. The
taxpayer  had still not moved into the new addition over 6
years fter beginning construction. The court held that the
construction costs of the addition could not be added to the
purchase price of the second residence for purposes of I.R.C.
§ 1034; therefore, the taxpayers were not eligible for rollover
f he gain from the sale of the first house. Parker v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-347.
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TAX RATES . The IRS also announced the inflation
adjusted tax tables and other inflation adjusted figures for
2000. The standard deductions for 2000 are $7,350 for joint
filers, $6,450 for heads of households, $4,400 for single filers
and $3,675 for married individuals who file separately. The
personal exemption is $2,800. The income limit for the
maximum earned income credit has increased to $6,920 for a
qualifying individual with one child, $9,720 for a taxpayer
with two or more children, and $4,610 for a taxpayer with no
children. The EIC will be denied if the aggregate amount of
certain investment income exceeds $2,400. Rev. Proc. 99-42,
I.R.B. 1999-__.
TRUSTS. A trust was established for a child of the
grantors. Transfers of property and money to the trust were
subject to the absolute power of the beneficiary to withdraw
those transfers within 30 days. If the beneficiary failed to
exercise the withdrawal power, the beneficiary retained a
right to have all trust income allocable to the portion of the
transfers subject to the power to withdraw, in the sole
discretion of the trustee, distributed to the beneficiary or
accumulated for future distribution to the beneficiary. The
IRS ruled that, because the beneficiary had a power to
withdraw all of the transfers of property and money to the
trust, the beneficiary would be treated as the owner of the
entire trust under I.R.C. § 678(a). Ltr. Rul. 9942037, June 7,
1999.
PRODUCT LIABILITY
HAY BALER- ALM § 2.04.*  The plaintiff’s decedent was
killed when the decedent became entangled in a round hay
baler manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff sued for
negligence, strict liability and breach of implied warranty.
The defendant sought summary judgment, arguing that the
baler was not defectively designed and the plaintiff failed to
show causation. The defendant claimed that there was no
evidence that alternative designs were available and feasible.
The plaintiff had provided evidence that other manufacturers
were producing balers with additional safety features. The
court held the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to raise a
jury question as to negligent design. The court also denied
summary judgment on the causation issue because the
plaintiff’s experts would testify as to the defects in the baler
which could have caused the injury, creating a jury question
as to causation. The trial jury went on to render a verdict for
the plaintiff and the appellate court affirmed.  Kinser v. Gehl
Co., 184 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999), aff’g, 989 F. Supp.
1144 (D. Kan. 1997).
STATE TAXATION
GREENHOUSES. The taxpayer operated an ornamental
horticultural nursery which included polyethylene
greenhouses. The greenhouses were constructed on cement
posts embedded in the ground. The greenhouses were
constructed by fastening metal hoops to the posts by steel
bolts. The plastic was then stretched over the hoops to create
the ncl sure. Doors and exhaust fans were built into the ends
of each greenhouse. The greenhouses had no permanent floor
or foundation but cement walkways were poured inside each
greenhouse. Each greenhouse had electricity, water and gas
connections. The township tax tribunal ruled that the
greenhouses were not part of the real property; therefore, the
greenhouses were exempt from taxation as personal property
used in agricultural operations. The court disagreed, holding
that he greenhouses were annexed to the real property by
bolts and gravity; therefore, the greenhouses were subject to
taxation as part of the real property. The court noted that,
although the greenhouses could be readily moved, theyhad
utilities connected to them, a permanent walkway inside and
were not moved as part of the nursery operation. Tuinier v.
Bedford Charter Township, 599 N.W.2d 116 (Mich Ct.
App. 1999).
TRESPASS
LIVESTOCK.  The plaintiff grew pumpkins on land
neighboring the defendant’s farm. The plaintiff sued in strict
liability, under S.D.C.L. §§ 40-28-4, 40-28-18, for damages
to the pumpkin crop caused by the defendants’ cattle when
they trespassed on the plaintiff’s land. The suit was brought
more than six months after the plaintiff discovered the
damage from the trespass but within one year after the
damage occurred. The defendant argued that the suit was
barred by the statute of limitations for actions under Section
40-28-18. The statute required suits to be filed “no later than
one year after the trespass occurred or six months after [the
plaintiff] knew or should have known of the injury resulting
from the trespass.” The court held that the statute was
ambiguous and interpreted the statute to mean that the
plaintiff could file an action within the later date of one year
after the occurrence of the trespass or the date six months
after the plaintiff knew or should have known about the
injury caused by the trespass. Because the suit was filed
within one year after the trespass, the suit was timely filed.
Zoss v. Schaffers, 598 N.W.2d 550 (S.D. 1999).
CITATION UPDATES
Estate of Davenport v. Comm’r, 184 F.3d 1176 (10th
Cir. 1999), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1997-390 (gift) see p. 116
supra.
Estate of Magnin v. Comm'r, 184 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.
1999), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 1996-25 (transfers with retained
interests) see p. 117 supra.
Holmes v. Comm’r, 184 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’g,
T.C. Memo. 1997-401 (hobby losses) see p. 109 supra.
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4th Annual
SEMINAR IN PARADISE
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 24-28, 2000
Royal Lahaina Resort, Kaanapali Beach, Island of Maui, Hawai’i
Celebrate the Millenium by leaving winter behind and spending a week in Hawai'i in January 2000! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand Kaanapali beach and the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-
class seminar on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Prof. Roger A. McEowen.  The
seminar is scheduled for January 24-28, 2000 at the spectacular ocean-front Royal Lahaina Resort on the island of
Maui, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Monday through Friday, with plenty of time to golf,
play tennis or just lie in the warm Hawaian sun. A continental breakfast and break refreshments for each day are
included in the registration fee,  Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 500 page seminar manual, Farm
Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the seminar. A CD-ROM
version will also be available for a small additional charge.
     Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business  deduction
(FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of
both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts and medicaid trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares and insure availability of convenient flights at a
busy travel time of the year. Attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the Royal
Lahaina Resort, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law
Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law. The registration fee for nonsubscribers is $695.
Subscribers should have received their brochure.
Call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958 or e-mail: aglaw@aol.com, if you need a brochure for this seminar or want to register.
